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I. INTRODUCTION
The prevention of terrorist attacks is a paramount concern for the
United States government.' An invaluable part of the effort is aimed at
cutting the economic legs of international terrorism by proscribing
Americans from providing financial resources to any foreign terrorist
organization (FTO).2 Although the statutory scheme for banning such
support, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, has existed since 1996,3 the government
only began aggressively prosecuting the crime after September 11,
200 1.4 Since then, much debate has revolved around the appropriate in-
terpretation of the mens rea element of § 2339B. 5 Currently, if a donor of
material support knows that the recipient has been designated as an FTO
or has engaged in terrorism or terrorist activity, the donor is criminally
liable, even if the donor intended the aid to be used lawfully.6 Congress
has taken the position that all support--even humanitarian and non-
violent aid-strengthens terrorist organizations and their ability to
I J.D. Candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2007; B.A. University of Washington, 2004. I
am deeply indebted to and would like to thank my parents, Robert and Carolyn, for their enduring
love and tenacious support; Erin Pyne, for her unfailing encouragement and patience; and Professor
Connie Krontz, for introducing me to the world of material support.
1. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-32, § 301, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996) (placed at the end of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B but not codified) [hereinafter AEDPA].
2. Id.
3. Id. § 303.
4. Accurate statistics on the charging decisions of federal prosecutors are not easily attained,
but the numbers do show an apparent dramatic increase. See Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Sce-
nario: Terrorism Support Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 20 n. 124
(2005) ("As of December 2001, the government had prosecuted only three cases involving material
support to terrorist organizations."); DAVID COLE & JAMES DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 127 (2d ed. 2002). However, within three years after September 11, 2001, the gov-
emnment had charged fifty-six individuals with violating § 2339B. See Chesney, supra, at 20.
5. Randolph N. Jonakait, The Mens Rea for the Crime of Providing Material Resources to a
Foreign Terrorist Organization, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 861, 862 (2004).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2004).
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execute terrorist attacks.7 Thus, even support aimed at influencing FTOs
to pursue solely peaceful objectives or efforts to aid non-affiliated civil-
ians who live in areas controlled by FTOs can currently be prohibited by
§ 2339B.
However, this statutory "knowledge standard" raises distressing
substantive due process issues in light of the Fifth Amendment's re-
quirement that criminal statutes punish those with personal guilt. "The
doctrine of personal guilt is one of the most fundamental principles of
our jurisprudence. It partakes of the very essence of the concept of free-
dom and due process of law." 8 The doctrine provides that guilt is per-
sonal, and it "ought not lightly be imputed to a citizen who ... has no
evil intentions or consciousness of wrongdoing." 9 In the seminal case
addressing the intersection of personal guilt and criminal organizations,
Scales v. United States,'0 the Supreme Court announced a test to deter-
mine whether personal guilt is satisfied: when a punishment is imposed
on a person because of that person's relationship with a criminal organi-
zation, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 1 requires that
the relationship between the individual's conduct and the criminal activ-
ity of the organization be substantial. 12
Section 2339B may run afoul of the Scales test because there are
many situations where a donation from a donor with an innocent intent
may have no relationship to international terrorism, yet personal guilt is
nonetheless imputed to the donor. One district court determined that in
order to cure § 2339B of this constitutional pitfall, a specific intent stan-
dard should be read into the statute, which would render a donor liable
only if the donation was specifically intended to support the illegal aims
of an FTO. 13
This Comment contends that, while the knowledge standard is con-
stitutionally infirm, the specific intent standard, under Scales, is constitu-
tionally unnecessary. The specific intent standard is also unduly burden-
some for the government, as it permits skillful terrorist sympathizers to
evade detection and slip through the prosecutorial net. However, another
intent level exists that can cast a net equipped with a far finer mesh: reck-
lessness. Section 2339B should be amended to require that a donor of
7. See AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-32, § 301, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
8. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 163 (1945).
9. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 286 (1943).
10. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
11. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that "No person shall ... be
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12. Scales, 367 U.S. at 224-25.
13. United States v. Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1339 (M.D. Fla. 2004), reconsideration
denied, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
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material support have a reckless intent. A recklessness standard passes
constitutional muster under Scales, and simultaneously preserves the
government's ability to deter support for terrorism.
In Part I, this Comment details the designation process of FTOs
and examines the wide array of purposes and activities in which FTOs
engage. Part III chronicles how § 2339B has evolved through amend-
ments and judicial interpretation. Part IV establishes that Scales controls
the personal guilt analysis and identifies due process concerns implicated
by Scales that have been overlooked by the courts. Finally, Part V argues
a recklessness standard is the most appropriate fix to § 2339B and
proposes a model amendment to that end.
II. THE DESIGNATION AND SPECTRUM OF
FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
Section 2339B acts as a uniform prohibition on the provision of
material support to FTOs. But not all FTOs operate in a uniform manner,
which can create serious due process implications. The following Part
explains how and why organizations are designated as FTOs. And, in
order to appreciate how a recklessness standard would apply to a spec-
trum of FTOs, this Part also analyzes and attempts to categorize FTOs
through three distinctions that highlight their important differences.
Discretion to designate an organization as an FTO is afforded to the
U.S. Secretary of State under 8 U.S.C. § 1189.14 The Secretary must de-
termine that (1) "the organization is a foreign organization;" (2) "the or-
ganization engages in terrorist activity;"'15 and (3) "the terrorist activity
of the organization threatens the security of the United States. '16 Then
Congress must approve the Secretary's designation for the organization
to be registered. 7 An organization being considered for designation need
not be notified and has no right to be involved in the designation
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(2004).
15. "Terrorist activity," as used by § 2339B, is defined by a list of specific acts that are "unlaw-
ful under the laws of the place where [they are] committed." Id. § 1 182(a)(3)(B)(iii). Terrorist activ-
ity includes the following: high-jacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an aircraft, vessel,
or vehicle); seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain, another indi-
vidual in order to compel a third person (including a governmental organization) to do or abstain
from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the individual seized or
detained; a violent attack upon an internationally protected person or upon the liberty of such a per-
son; an assassination; the use of any biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device;
the use of any explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere personal
monetary gain) with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals
or to cause substantial damage to property; or a threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the
foregoing. Id.
16. Id. § 1189(a)(1).
17. Id. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(i).
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process. 18 However, once designated, an FTO has the right to challenge
the designation in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. 19 There are several ramifications for an organization so desig-
nated,2 ° including the applicability of the material support statute.2 1
Forty-two organizations have been designated as FTOs as of Octo-
ber 2005.22 From the Basque Fatherland and Liberty group in Spain, to
the Aum Shinrikyo of Japan, to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia, to al-Qaeda, the designated organizations span the globe and
the ideological spectrum. 23
Three distinctions help illustrate the fundamental differences
among FTOs. First, some have peaceful political goals-like securing
rights or freedoms through self-determination-while others have seem-
ingly unrealistic or patently iniquitous goals-like changing the global
structure and killing large segments of human society. Representing the
former group are such FTOs as the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)24 and
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In particular, the PKK, a
designated FTO since 1997,25 exists to "establish an independent, democ-
ratic Kurdish state in the Middle East., 26 The Kurds, who number
between 15 and 20 million, speak their own language, have their own
culture, and live in a region of the Middle East known as Kurdistan,
which spans contiguous parts of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.27 Efforts to
create an independent Kurdistan began after the dissolution of the Otto-
man Empire, but the results have often been disastrous.28 The Kurds have
faced bans on their language and traditional clothing, forced migration
and dilution, and sometimes outright annihilation. 29 Similarly, the LTTE
18. Id. § 1 189(a)(2)(A)(i), (3)(A).
19. Id. § 1189(b)(1).
20. In addition to the applicability of § 2339B, once designated, the organization's members
cannot enter the United States and, if they are found in U.S. territory, can be removed; any U.S.
financial institution that becomes aware that it has possession of funds in which an FTO has an in-
terest must retain possession of the funds and report it to the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the
U.S. Department of the Treasury. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS FACT
SHEET, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191 .htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. The PKK also uses the name Kongra-Gel. Id.
25. Id.
26. FED'N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, INTELLIGENCE RES. PROGRAM, KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY
INFORMATION, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/pkk.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
27. Who are the Kurds?, THE WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/inatl/daily/feb99/kurdprofile.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
28. Id.
29. Id. In Halabja, Iraq, five thousand Kurds were killed by a poison gas attack in 1988 by the
Iraqi government. Id.
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"seeks to protect the human rights of Tamils in Sri Lanka" and to create
an autonomous Tamil homeland in northeastern Sri Lanka.3 °
In contrast to FTOs created for the sole purpose of acquiring auton-
omy, some FTOs are not satisfied with merely establishing an independ-
ent state or sparking political change; instead, these FTOs harbor addi-
tional, politically unimaginable or intrinsically violent objectives. For
example, the Palestine Islamic Jihad is committed to the "destruction of
Israel through holy war." 3' Another example is al-Qaeda, which exists to
"establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout the world.32 These
organizations, in contrast to the PKK or LTTE, necessarily need violence
to accomplish their objectives. However, organizations are not desig-
nated as FTOs because of their choice of ends; rather, it is the organiza-
tion's choice of means that causes it to be so designated.
The second distinction looks at the FTO's means. Some FTOs are
categorized as "dual method ' 33 organizations because they engage in
both violent methods and legitimate political or humanitarian efforts.
Other FTOs are categorized as "single method" organizations because
they primarily use terrorism to further their objectives.34
For example, with varying consistency,35 the PKK has engaged in
sporadic "rural-based insurgency activities,, 36 but the organization has
also "sponsor[ed] international political forums, peace conferences, and
[Kurdish] cultural festivals. 37 Thus, because of the breadth of sponsored
activities, members of dual method organizations could conceivably sup-
port only peaceful projects and need not necessarily endorse their organi-
zation's use of violence. 38 At the other end of the spectrum are single
method organizations, like al-Qaeda, which admittedly have little interest
in peacefully obtaining their goals and instead commit themselves to
executing catastrophic terrorist attacks aimed at coercing their enemies
30. Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 352 F.3d 382, 390 (9th Cir. 2003)
[hereinafter HLP 11], vacated by Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of State, 393 F.3d 902 (9th
Cir. 2004).
31. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON DESIGNATED TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS 103, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10300.pdf [herein-
after BACKGROUND].
32. Id. at 105.
33. Some courts have also described dual method organizations as "bifarious." See, e.g.,
United States v. Marzook, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1067 (N.D. 111. 2005).
34. Tom Stacy, The "Material Support" Offense: The Use of Strict Liability in the War Against
Terror, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 461, 465 (2005).
35. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRACTICES: TURKEY
(2001), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/eur/844.htm.
36. Id.
37. HLPII, 352 F.3d 382, 389 (9th Cir. 2003).
38. Stacy, supra note 34, at 465.
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into submitting to their demands. 39 For example, an al-Qaeda Training
Manual, discovered and seized by British police in Manchester, states
that "Islamic governments have never and will never be established
through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils.' 40
A third important characteristic to take into account when analyzing
FTOs is that some retain de facto control over certain territory or non-
FTO affiliated civilians, while others operate in the midst of functional
states. For example, the LTTE, in order to "protect the human rights of
Tamils in Sri Lanka and achieve self-determination, '41 has maintained de
facto control over northeastern Sri Lanka and established a governmental
structure for over 500,000 Tamils.42 Under this structure, the LTTE pro-
vides social services, education, a civilian police force, and even man-
ages the economy.43 The PKK has also established a quasi-governmental
structure in parts of Turkey.44 Thus, donors desiring to support these non-
FTO affiliated civilians must necessarily act with the acquiescence or
support of these designated terrorist organizations. Most FTOs, however,
operate covertly inside of functioning states and retain no territorial sov-
ereignty or control over non-FTO affiliated civilians.45
The above three distinctions are not intended to serve as a critique
of the decision to designate organizations as FTOs; but they do illustrate
that not all FTOs desire the same ends, employ the same means, or oper-
ate under similar circumstances--differences that can have significant
due process implications under Scales. The one element FTOs have in
common is that they are all subject to § 2339B.
39. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Al-Qaeda Training Manual 3, http://www.usdoj.gov/
ag/manualpart1_1 .pdf.
40. Id.
41. HLP I1, 352 F.3d at 390.
42. See Oversight Hearing on Amendments to the Material Support for Terrorism Laws -
Section 805 of the USA PATRIOT Act at Section 6603 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (2005), http://www.tamilnation.org/intframe/us/terrorism/05aclu.htm (last
visited Feb. 17, 2007) (testimony of Ahilan T. Arulanantham, Staff Attorney for the American Civil
Liberties Union of Southern California) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing].
43. HLPII, 352 F.3d at 391.
44. Id. at 389 (quoting Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1208 (C.D. Cal.
1998)).
45. See, e.g., BACKGROUND, supra note 31. Another FTO with significant territorial control is
Hamas, which now is in majority control of Palestine after its victory at the polls on January 26,
2006. Hamas Invited to Form Government, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
middleeast/4654220.stm (last visited Feb. 17, 2007). Unlike the PKK or LTTE, Hamas does not
operate in the midst of a functional state. Instead, Hamas effectively is the functional state. As of
publication, however, Hamas has entered into a power-sharing agreement with the rival, and often
considered more peaceful, Fatah faction. Scott Wilson, Palestinian Legislators Approve Unity Cabi-
net, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2007, at A20.
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III. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B As IT STANDS
The current mens rea requirement of § 2339B is the product of
Congress's responses to terrorist attacks and courts' responses to
constitutional attacks. This Part describes how Congress has clearly ex-
pressed its preference for the knowledge standard through the birth and
evolution of § 2339B. It also briefly discusses the three interpretations of
§ 2339B's mens rea requirement. It ends by examining the multiple con-
stitutional challenges to § 2339B based on the due process requirement
of personal guilt.
A. The Development of§ 2339B and Congressional
Preference for the Knowledge Standard
Congress reacted to the terrorist bombing of the World Trade Cen-
ter in 1993 by passing a series of bills aimed at cutting off economic
46support to terrorist organizations. Included in these bills was the first
material support statute, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. Section 2339A
criminalized the provision of "material support" to any recipient when
the donor either "kn[ew] or intend[ed] that [the support would] be used
in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation" of any one of several
offenses, not necessarily terrorist-related.47 But § 2339A did not fore-
close the possibility of donors supporting criminals: a donor would not
be liable for supporting a criminal so long as he or she did not know or
specifically intend the aid to do so. Critics of § 2339A cited this "specific
intent standard" as creating a dangerous loophole in the economic fight
against terrorism. 48 Essentially, all forms of support short of weaponry
could be supplied to terrorist organizations provided that the donor ex-
pected the aid to be used lawfully. Section 2339A also created prosecuto-
rial hardship by requiring that the donor's support be traced to a specific
act of terrorism, which the 9/11 Commission in 2004 noted was "a prac-
tical impossibility. 'A9
46. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796
(1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S. Code).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2002).
48. Chesney, supra note 4, at 13 (citing Todd J. Gillman, FBI Looks Into Islamic Fund Rais-
ing: Muslim Officials Deny Supporting Terrorism, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 18, 1994, at
29A).
49. Id. (quoting NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES,
MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING 31-32 (2004), available at http://www.9-11 commission.
gov/staff statements/91 ITerrFinMonograph.pdf).
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Congress addressed this loophole 50 by passing the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) following the terrorist bomb-
ing of the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City in 1995.51
AEDPA created a second material support law-codified as 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B--designed to better equip the government to fight terrorism by
omitting a specific intent standard when the recipient of the aid is a des-
ignated FTO.52 Thus, in 1996, a person violated § 2339B(a)(1) by
"knowingly" providing "material support or resources" to an FTO.53 The
term "material support or resources" was borrowed from § 2339A and
broadly defined as follows:
The term "material support or resources" means any property, tan-
gible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary in-
struments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, train-
ing, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, le-
thal substances, explosives, personnel (one or more individuals who
may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or
religious materials.54
Congress later amended § 2339B with the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Ob-
struct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) in October 2001; the poten-
tial prison term was increased from a 10- to a 15-year limit, and, if death
55results from a violation, the penalty can be up to life in prison.
Although the term "knowingly" indicated that Congress intended to
require some type of mens rea in order for an individual to violate
§ 2339B, 56 just exactly what level of knowledge, and what the knowl-
edge applied to, remained unclear. 57 Three predominant constructions of
the mens rea requirement for the statute subsequently developed:
(1) knowledge that a person is providing something (that happens to be
50. A House Judiciary Committee report "explained that § 2339B would go even further than §
2339A by criminalizing for the first time even donations that are intended only for humanitarian
purposes." James P. Fantetti, John Walker Lindh, Terrorist? Or Merely a Citizen Exercising his
Constitutional Freedom: The Limits of the Freedom of Association in the Aftermath of September
Eleventh, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1382 (2003).
51. See AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-32, § 301, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
52. Stacy, supra note 34, at 462.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2004).
54. Id. § 2339A(b)(1).
55. Id. § 2339B. With life imprisonment on the line if death results from a violation, Congress
likely intended to convey the seriousness with which it considers the provision of material support.
But it is also worth noting that the tracking required to determine if a death results from a violation
would present many of the same evidentiary problems as § 2339A.
56. HLP 11, 352 F.3d 382, 400 (9th Cir. 2003).
57. Jonakait, supra note 5, at 862.
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material support) to someone (who happens to be a member of an
FTO)-a "strict liability standard;, 58 (2) knowledge that the recipient is a
designated FTO or knowledge of the activities that would cause the
recipient to be so designated-a "knowledge standard;, 59 and (3) knowl-
edge or desire that the recipient would use the support to further the
illegal activities of the FTO-a "specific intent standard. 6°
After reviewing the varying judicial interpretations of § 2339B's
scienter requirement (discussed infra), Congress again amended
§ 2339B(a)(1) in December 2004 to articulate exactly which mens rea
requirement it intended: "To violate [§ 2339B], a person must have
knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization,
that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity, or that
the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism.",6' This latest
amendment expressly adopts the knowledge standard.62 Because a donor
need not desire his donation be used illicitly, the result is that no humani-
tarian aid can be supplied to any FTO through the hands of even well-
intentioned Americans. Indeed, Congress intended as much. The findings
of Congress in enacting AEDPA state that "foreign organizations that
engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that
any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct., 63
The only evidence of a contrary intent from the Congressional
Record stems from a single statement ascribed to Senator Orrin Hatch, a
co-sponsor of AEDPA, made in 1996:
This bill ... includes provisions making it a crime to knowingly
provide material support to the terrorist functions of foreign groups
designated by a Presidential finding to be engaged in terrorist activi-
ties .... [N]othing in the Constitution provides the right to engage
in violence against fellow citizens or foreign nations. Aiding and fi-
nancing foreign terrorist bombings is not constitutionally protected
58. A strict liability standard requires no intent, except the desire to provide something to
someone. A donor can be liable even if he or she did not know the recipient had any relationship to a
terrorist organization.
59. This knowledge standard, or "guilty knowledge," while a form of mens rea, does not take
into account actual intent; thus, a donor can be convicted under the knowledge standard so long as he
or she knew the recipient was an FTO, but whatever the donor actually intended to happen to the
donation (for example, intended it to feed children or purchase explosives) is irrelevant.
60. United States v. AI-Arian, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2004). Although the
specific intent standard was irreconcilable with congressional intent, its proponents argued it was
necessary for § 2339B to be constitutional. Id.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(l) (2004).
62. The 2004 amendment also further defined the provision of personnel and provided an ex-
ception to the statute where a person may not be criminally liable for providing "personnel," "train-
ing," or "expert advice or assistance" if the person had the permission of the Secretary of State with
the concurrence of the Attorney General. Id. § 2339B(j).
63. AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-32, § 303, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
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activity .... I am convinced we have crafted a narrow but effective
designation provision which meets these obligations while safe-
guarding the freedom to associate, which none of us would will-
ingly give up.64
Senator Hatch did not declare it would be a crime to knowingly
provide support to an FTO; he instead stated it will be a crime to know-
ingly provide support to an FTO's terrorist functions, such as bombings.
This is equivalent to the specific intent standard. However, it is likely
that Senator Hatch misspoke because he made no other similar state-
ments on record, and he co-sponsored and voted for § 2339B even
though the bill lacked a specific intent requirement.6 5
Regardless, the language of § 2339B and its subsequent develop-
ment strongly suggest that Congress intended the knowledge standard
and thereby intended to prevent any American from supplying any aid to
any FTO. Such clear intent from Congress can only be overridden if the
statute's link between punishment and culpability is unconstitutional.66
B. Judicial Interpretation of the Mens Rea Requirement for § 2339B
There have been multiple constitutional challenges targeting the
mens rea requirement of § 2339B, including arguments based on free-
dom of association, vagueness, overbreadth, and the due process re-
quirement of personal guilt. Although most of the challenges have not
been successful, 67 a few courts have held that some terms of "material
support" are impermissibly vague. This Comment focuses on
64. 142 CONG. REC. S3352-01 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
65. Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 2005)
[hereinafter HLP I1].
66. Stacy, supra note 34, at 468.
67. See, e.g., HLP 111, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 1134; United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316 (4th
Cir. 2004) (en banc); Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 572
(E.D. Va. 2002).
68. See, e.g., Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 329; Boim, 291 F.3d at 1026; Humanitarian Law Project
v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter HLP I], cert. denied, Humanitarian
Law Project v. Ashcroft, 532 U.S. 904 (2001). Although the numerous challenges based on the
vagueness doctrine have encountered some success, it appears that courts may be applying the
wrong doctrine, and possibly even substituting their personal guilt concerns for a vagueness defi-
ciency. In order to withstand a vagueness challenge, a law must be "sufficiently clear so as to allow
persons of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may
act accordingly." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). The Ninth Circuit in HLP
I held that the terms "personnel" and "training" were impermissibly vague because the court could
construe situations where simply advocating the cause of an FTO could be considered providing
"personnel" and where teaching international law to members of an FTO could be considered pro-
viding "training." 205 F.3d at 1137-38. Finding that such a result was unacceptable, the HLP I court
held that these terms provided insufficient guidance as to what type of behavior is proscribed and
consequently were unconstitutional and unenforceable. Id. at 1138. However, these courts may be
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challenges based on the Fifth Amendment's substantive due process
requirement of personal guilt,69 and concentrates primarily on three deci-
sions that have solidified the debate as between the knowledge and
specific intent standards.
1. Humanitarian Law Project v. United States Department of Justice
The Ninth Circuit first addressed a due process personal guilt chal-
lenge to § 2339B in 2003 with its decision in Humanitarian Law Project
v. United States Department of Justice (HLP 117).71 In HLP II, the plain-
tiffs sought to provide aid to the nonviolent humanitarian and political
efforts of the LTTE and PKK.72 Fearing their donations would be
considered material support, the plaintiffs challenged § 2339B on the
grounds that the statute did not require any form of personal guilt. 73 The
government-this being prior to the 2004 amendment that clarified con-
gressional intent-had adopted a strict liability interpretation of § 2339B
and argued personal guilt was unnecessary under the plain language of
the statute.74
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis with the personal guilt test
from the Supreme Court's 1961 decision in United States v. Scales:
In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of
punishment on a status or on conduct can only be justified by refer-
ence to the relationship of that status or conduct to other concededly
criminal activity ... that relationship must be sufficiently substan-
incorrectly applying the vagueness doctrine. See Stacy, supra note 34, at 468; see also Chesney,
supra note 4, at 56-58. The vagueness doctrine merely requires that a law be understandable to a
reasonable person. It is unlikely that a reasonable person would not consider it "training" when he or
she teaches members of an FTO how to use international law to peacefully advocate for their goals.
In this circumstance, it is not the clarity of the statutory language that is problematic; it is the fact
that the teacher can face fifteen years in prison while lacking any devious intent. Stacy, supra note
34, at 468. In other words, it is not that the "material support" terms are too vague, but rather that
donors can be punished while lacking culpability.
69. Although Fifth Amendment due process challenges generally implicate related First
Amendment association and Fifth Amendment vagueness arguments, this author believes it is possi-
ble, and even helpful, to separate the arguments and focus solely on personal guilt.
70. Most commentators and courts, including the Ninth Circuit, refer to the series of Humani-
tarian Law Project cases using Roman numerals. In the first Ninth Circuit decision, HLP 1, 205 F.3d
at 1130, the same plaintiffs as in HLP II challenged § 2339B on First Amendment and vagueness
grounds.
71. HLP I1, 352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003).
72. Id. at 385.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 397.
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tial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand at-
tack under the Due Process Clause.75
Accordingly, Scales required the Ninth Circuit to examine the sub-
stantiality of the relationship between an individual providing support to
an FTO and the concededly criminal activity of the FTO. 76 The govern-
ment asserted that it could convict a person of donating support to an
FTO under § 2339B "even if he or she does not know the organization is
so designated. 7 7 Unsatisfied with the government's interpretation, the
Ninth Circuit determined that "to attribute the intent to commit unlawful
acts punishable by life imprisonment to persons who acted with innocent
intent-in this context, without critical information about the relevant
organization-contravenes the Fifth Amendment's requirement of 'per-
sonal guilt.' 78 Thus, the court found that the strict liability standard vio-
lates the Scales requirement of personal guilt.79
Having concluded that § 2339B raised severe due process concerns,
the court looked to a long line of jurisprudence, beginning with Scales,
that construed statutes lacking scienter to include mens rea requirements
to avoid sticky constitutional issues.80 Following such precedent, the
Ninth Circuit in HLP II read a knowledge standard into § 2339B,8 1 dis-
pelling any notions that the statute was a strict liability offense.8 2 The
court said it "believe[d] that when Congress included the term 'know-
ingly' in § 2339B, it meant that proof that a defendant knew of the
organization's designation as a terrorist organization or proof that a de-
75. Id. at 394 (quoting Scales, 367 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1961)) (emphasis added by the HLP I
court).
76. Id. at 394-97.
77. Id. at 397.
78. Id.
79. The HLP I1 court determined that § 2339B did not fall into the category of offenses-
known as strict liability "public welfare" offenses-that are exceptions to the personal guilt require-
ment. These offenses generally regulate items such as "firearms, corrosive liquids, and drugs" that
are so innately hazardous as to put the individual on notice of a probable regulation. Id. at 401. In
contrast, the court noted that "charitable contributions are not 'inherently dangerous"' and their
"prohibited uses may be seemingly permissible." Id. at 402 (quoting United States v. Freed, 401
U.S. 601, 609 (1971)). Moreover, the court noted that the basic nature of the crime (that is, not a
mere regulatory offense), the harshness of the penalties (that is, potential sentence of up to life in
prison), and the lack of any indication Congress intended § 2339B to function without a scienter
requirement all suggested that § 2339B was not a public welfare offense and instead required some
level of mens rea. Id. at 400-02.
80. Id. at 395-96. The court stated that it was mindful of the principle that "a statute is to be
construed where fairly possible so as to avoid substantial constitutional questions." Id. at 397 (quot-
ing United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994)).
81. Id. at 400.
82. In the next case where the mens rea requirement of § 2339B was in dispute, the govern-
ment abandoned the strict liability argument and adopted the knowledge standard. United States v.
AI-Arian, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1296 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
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fendant knew of the unlawful activities that caused it to be so designated
was required to convict a defendant under the statute., 83
2. United States v. AI-Arian
In United States v. Al-Arian, the district court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Florida went a step further than the Ninth Circuit in HLP H and
read a specific intent standard into § 2339B. 84 In Al-Arian, alleged mem-
bers of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a registered FTO, were charged
with violating § 2339B by directing fundraising and other activities in
the United States.85 At the outset, the Al-Arian court noted that in passing
the AEDPA, Congress intended to prosecute the crime of providing "ma-
terial support to foreign organizations engaged in terrorist activities 'to
the fullest possible basis, consistent with the Constitution.' ' 8 6 To deter-
mine § 2339B's consistency with the Constitution, the Al-Arian court
tested several hypotheticals against the knowledge standard:
Under [HLP] II's construction [of § 2339B's mens rea require-
ment], a cab driver could be guilty for giving a ride to a FTO mem-
ber to the UN, if he knows that the person is a member of a FTO or
the member or his organization at sometime conducted an unlawful
activity in a foreign country. Similarly, a hotel clerk in New York
could be committing a crime by providing lodging to that same FTO
member under similar circumstances as the cab driver. Because the
[HLP] II's construction fails to avoid potential Fifth Amendment
concerns, this Court rejects its construction of Section 2339B.87
In support of its conclusion that there were constitutional issues with the
knowledge standard, the Al-Arian court relied on both the vagueness
doctrine 8 and the due process requirement of personal guilt.89 For its
83. HLP I, 352 F.3d at 400.
84. 329 F. Supp. 2d at 1302-03.
85. Id. at 1295.
86. 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1329 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (quoting AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-32,
§ 301(b), 110 Stat. 1214 (1996)).
87. 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1337-38.
88. Id. at 1338. By substituting personal guilt concerns for vagueness concerns, the Al-Arian
court may have misapplied the vagueness doctrine as well. See supra note 68. The Al-Arian court
claimed that a "substantial portion" of § 2339B's material support components were unconstitution-
ally vague because they could be violated by "innocent conduct." 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1338. But the
hypotheticals employed by Al-Arian are "troubling not because of the First Amendment or undue
vagueness but rather because the cab driver and the hotel clerk lack the culpability the criminal law
traditionally requires." Stacy, supra note 34, at 468. In other words, the problem with § 2339B is
not vagueness or clarity: it would be clear to the cab driver he was providing "transportation," and it
would be equally clear to the hotel clerk that he is providing "lodging." The real problem with
§ 2339B is that there is a disconnect between culpability and liability-the statute does not require
personal guilt (discussed infra).
89. Al-Arian, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 1299.
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personal guilt analysis, the court began with Scales.90 The government
took the position that Scales only applied to statutes that prohibit a status
or membership in an organization, so-called "membership statutes." 9
But the Al-Arian court stated that Scales "is not so narrowly worded., 92
In fact, as the Al-Arian court pointed out, the Supreme Court in Scales
stated:
In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when imposition of pun-
ishment on a status or on conduct can only be justified by reference
to the relationship of that status or conduct to other concededly
criminal activity ... that relationship must be sufficiently substan-
tial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand at-
tack under the Due Process Clause.93
The Al-Arian court claimed that if Scales was intended to only apply to
membership statutes, then the Supreme Court would not have used the
words "or conduct" in its test.9
4
The Al-Arian court then reasoned that Scales implicates personal
guilt concerns for § 2339B because a person's liability is determined by
the criminal activity of an FTO, and not by the individual. 95 For illustra-
tion, the court discussed another hypothetical:
A and B are members of a FTO. The FTO exists to oppose and re-
move (by violent and non-violent means) a foreign government. A
opposes the FTO's use of violent means to accomplish its goals. B
has no problem with the groups [sic] use of violence and wants to
raise funds for weapons to further that interest. B travels to where A
lives to raise money. A does not know that B is coming to fundraise
on behalf of the FTO. A picks B up at the airport. A allows B to
stay in his home, use his telephone, and use his house to entertain
other FTO members while A is at work. B fundraises while A is
gone. Under the government's construction of Section 2339B(a)(1),
A is criminally liable for providing transportation, lodging, commu-
nications equipment, and facilities, and, if the money raised results
in the death of any person, he will face life in prison. A's criminal
liabiliV is inextricably connected to his association with B and the
FTO.9 6
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. (quoting Scales, 367 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1961)) (emphasis added by the Al-Arian court).
94. Id. at 1300.
95. Id.
96. Id.
[Vol. 30:777
Material Support Offense and Personal Guilt
Implying that A lacks sufficient personal guilt to justify liability, the
Al-Arian court stated that a "Fifth Amendment due process personal guilt
concern is suggested, because criminal liability and punishment is being
justified and tied to the criminal activities of others. 'g Accordingly, in
order to alleviate this concern while not striking down significant por-
tions of § 2339B as unconstitutional, the Al-Arian court construed the
statute as requiring the government to prove a defendant had a specific
intent to further the illegal goals of the organization.9 8 The Al-Arian court
posited that in the typical case the government's burden of proving
specific intent would not be that great because it could be "easily in-
ferred" from circumstantial evidence. 99
The Al-Arian court's position on Scales, while not adopted by any
subsequent courts, is consistent with one prior civil case and has since
been approved by the dissent in a criminal case. In the civil case of Boim
v. Quranic Literacy Institute and Holy Land Foundation for Relief and
Development,100 the Seventh Circuit analyzed whether § 2339B could
serve as the basis for civil liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2333.101 The court
was troubled over the fact that donors of material support "might be held
liable for involvement in terrorist activity when all they intended was to
supply money to fund the legitimate, humanitarian mission" of an
FTO. 10 2 Citing Scales and other Supreme Court precedent, the Boim
court held that a defendant is therefore not civilly liable under § 2333
unless the plaintiff can prove the defendant intended to aid the illicit ac-
tivities of the FTO. °3 Also, in United States v. Hammoud,104 a majority
of the Fourth Circuit en banc panel dismissed arguments that § 2339B
did not satisfy the Fifth Amendment right to personal guilt.
10 5
But dissenting Judges Michael and Gregory expressly agreed with
the analysis in Al-Arian, arguing that § 2339B needs a specific intent
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1339 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
100. 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002).
101. Id. at 1007. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) provides as follows:
Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by
reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may
sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover three-
fold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney's fees.
102. Id. at 1022.
103. Id. at 1022-23. The Al-Arian court itself noted that its conclusions were consistent with
Boim. 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1339 n.33.
104. 381 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2004).
105. In its brief discussion of personal guilt, the majority tapered the holding of Scales to the
First Amendment right of association arguments, and then declared that § 2339B concerns more than
just association, it covers the provision of material support (this method, discussed infra Part IV(b),
is commonly used by courts to limit Scales application). Id. at 328-39.
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standard in order to withstand a Fifth Amendment personal guilt at-
tack.10 6 However, since Hammoud and Boim, Al-Arian has not received
much judicial support; instead, courts have been lining up to support
HLP 11. 107
3. Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales1 °8
After the ruling in 2003 of the Ninth Circuit three-judge panel in
HLP H construed § 2339B to require the knowledge standard, the Ninth
Circuit voted to rehear the mens rea arguments en banc.10 9 But on De-
cember 17, 2004, only three days after oral argument, Congress amended
§ 2339B's mens rea requirement to include the knowledge standard. 10 In
response, on December 21, the Ninth Circuit en banc declined to
re-decide HLP II and vacated its order regarding the mens rea require-
ment. ' The Ninth Circuit then remanded the case, now called Humani-
tarian Law Project v. Gonzales (HLP III), to the Central District Court in
California, Western Division. 12
On remand, the plaintiffs urged the court to follow the reasoning of
Al-Arian and adopt a specific intent standard based on Scales.13 But the
HLP III court declined, asserting that Scales is "inapposite" to
§ 2339B.1 14 The court concluded that the Scales test applies only to
membership in an organization, and not to conduct in support of an or-
ganization: "While Scales discussed the concept of personal guilt in rela-
tion to 'status or conduct,' a close reading of Scales reveals that at heart
it was concerned with criminalizing associational membership in viola-
tion of the First Amendment."'" 5 Having narrowed Scales to protecting
only association, the HLP III court noted that § 2339B covers much more
than mere association; it also covers the actual provision of material sup-
port.' 16 For additional support, the HLP III court claimed that it was"significant" to its analysis that the "Ninth Circuit in HLP II did not
106. Id. at 376-80.
107. See infra notes 117-19.
108. HLP Il, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
109. Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 382 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004).
110. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2004). The amendment also made changes to the definition of
"material support" by amending the terms "training," "personnel," "expert advice or assistance" and
adding the term "service." Id.
111. HLP 11, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 1138-39.
112. Id. at 1139.
113. Id. at 1142.
114. Id. at 1142-43.
115. Id. at 1143.
116. Id.
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extend its Fifth Amendment analysis of Scales to require that the
government prove specific intent to further terrorist activities."' 17
As of publication, all the most recent cases considering the personal
guilt issue-United States v. Assi, 118 United States v. Paracha,1" 9 and
United States v. Marzook°20-have rejected Al-Arian, have expressly
agreed with the reasoning of HLP III, and have concluded that Scales
does not apply to § 2339B, insofar as the material support statute does
not apply to associational membership. 12 1
IV. FATAL CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES FOR § 2339B UNDER SCALES
This Part illustrates how § 2339B fails under Scales. It begins with
the facts of Scales and a description of the personal guilt test. It then ar-
gues that, contrary to the conclusion in HLP III, the Supreme Court's
decision in Scales controls the Fifth Amendment due process analysis.
Next, it describes the fundamental errors committed by the Al-Arian and
HLP II courts in applying Scales. Finally, underscoring the need for a
stricter mens rea requirement, this Part applies Scales to the current form
of § 2339B and determines that severe constitutional issues still exist
under the knowledge standard.
117. Id. at 1148.
118. United States v. Assi, 414 F. Supp. 2d 707 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
119. United States v. Paracha, No. 03-cr-I197(SHS), 2006 WL 12768 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 03,
2006).
120. United States v. Marzook, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (N.D. iII. 2005).
121. See Assi, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 721-22; Paracha, 2006 WL 12768, at *25-29; Marzook, 383
F. Supp. 2d at 1067. With respect to the Scales personal guilt requirement, only two other arguments
raised by these courts are worth briefly addressing here. In Assi, because Congress explicitly found
that all donations to an FTO facilitate terrorism, the district court judge found that a personal guilt
requirement is satisfied if the defendant knew the recipient was an FTO. 414 F. Supp. 2d at 721. In
other words, because Congress declared that the relationship between the provision of all donations
to an FTO and the terrorist activity of an FTO is strong, personal guilt is satisfied. But simply be-
cause Congress declares the constitutional requirement of personal guilt is satisfied, does not neces-
sarily make it so. When considering a statute's consistency with the Constitution, courts are to make
determinations independent of the desires of Congress. See Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 176-
77, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). Similarly, both Assi and Marzook emphasize the importance of Congress
intending only the knowledge standard. See Assi, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 721-24; Marzook, 383 F. Supp.
2d at 1070-71. But this observation is only relevant to the courts' power to rewrite § 2339B in order
to alter the mens rea requirement. For example, in Marzook, after detailing Congress's preference for
the knowledge standard, the court stated that "Reading in this additional [specific intent] requirement
... would contravene the fundamental concepts of statutory construction." Marzook, 383 F. Supp.
2d at 1070. However, whether § 2339B passes the Fifth Amendment requirement of personal guilt,
not whether courts have the ability to rewrite a clear statute, is the central question of this article.
Thus, under both arguments, a fresh look at the constitutionality of the statute is still necessary.
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A. United States v. Scales
Junius Irving Scales was a member of the Communist Party, a "dual
method" organization that advocated both peaceful and non-peaceful
methods in pursuit of its goals, the latter including the "violent overthrow
of the U.S. Government. '' 122 Scales was convicted under the Smith
Act, 123 which made it a felony to knowingly hold "membership in any
organization which advocates the overthrow of the Government of the
United States by force or violence."1 24 Scales argued the Act violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment "in that it impermissibly
impute[ed] guilt to an individual merely on the basis of his associations
and sympathies, rather than because of some concrete personal involve-
ment in criminal conduct.1 25
In response, the Supreme Court provided a test to determine what
types of relationships with criminal organizations can serve as the basis
for criminal liability.1 26 The test requires a court to analyze the substanti-
ality of the relationship between a person's status or conduct and an or-
ganization's concededly criminal activity.1 27 Where that relationship is
tenuous, personal guilt is required in order to convict someone on the
basis of that relationship; however, if the relationship between the ac-
cused's involvement and the underlying substantive illegal conduct is
122. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 220 (1961).
123. The Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1956), reads as follows:
Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or teaches the duty, necessity,
desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the United
States or the government of any State, Territory, District or Possession thereof, or the
government of any political subdivision therein, by force or violence, or by the assassina-
tion of any officer of any such government; or
Whoever, with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any such government,
prints, publishes, edits, issues, circulates, sells, distributes, or publicly displays any writ-
ten or printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or
propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or
violence, or attempts to do so; or
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or assembly of
persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any such gov-
ernment by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any such
society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof-
Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both,
and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or any department or agency
thereof, for the five years next following his conviction.
If two or more persons conspire to commit any offense named in this section, each shall
be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and
shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or any department or agency
thereof, for the five years next following his conviction.
124. Scales, 367 U.S. at 205.
125. Id. at 220.
126. Id. at 224-25.
127 Id
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strong, personal guilt is not required.128 Determining that the Smith Act
could impose guilt where the relationship was weak, the Scales Court
interpreted the statute to require personal guilt.' 29 The Court concluded
that this personal guilt deficit would be "certainly cured, so far as any
particular defendant is concerned, by the requirement of proof that he
knew the organization engages in criminal activity, and that it was his
purpose to further that criminal activity.' 30 Otherwise, the Court feared a
person could be convicted by what "might be regarded as merely an
expression of sympathy with the alleged criminal enterprise,
unaccompanied by any significant action in its support or any commit-
ment to undertake such action.' 131 In other words, spotting a potential
gap between culpability and liability, the Court read a specific intent
standard into the Smith Act to save it from constitutional attack.
B. Scales Controls the Personal Guilt Analysis
The HLP III court took the position that Scales does not apply to
§ 2339B because the statute under scrutiny in Scales was concerned with
membership in an organization instead of conduct in support of an or-
ganization. 132 Although the Scales Court applied its test to a membership
statute, this argument nonetheless fails for three reasons. First, the prin-
ciple behind Scales applies with equal force to § 2339B. The Scales test
covers circumstances where a person's guilt is determined by his rela-
tionship to a criminal enterprise, not by his intent. Such situations cer-
tainly occur where the connection to the organization is membership or"status." However, situations also occur-as the plaintiffs in the
Humanitarian Law Project cases demonstrate-where the connection to
the organization is actual "conduct."
Second, the unambiguous words of the Scales test itself apply to"status or conduct., 133 This language was crucial to the Al-Arian court's
adoption of a specific intent standard: "If Scales only applied to member-
ship statutes, the Supreme Court would not have needed to use the
phrases 'or on conduct' or 'or conduct' because 'status' would have been
sufficient to cover membership statutes."'' 34 Despite this recognition, 135
128. Id.
129. Id. at 224-28.
130. Id. at 226 n.18.
131. Id. at 228.
132. HLP II1, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1143 (C.D. Cal. 2005). Insofar as § 2339B covers more
than associational relationships, this position has some support in academia. See, e.g., Chesney,
supra note 4, at 68-70.
133. Scales, 367 U.S. at 224-25 (emphasis added).
134. United States v. AI-Arian, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
135. HLP 11, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 1143.
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the HLP III court maintained that Scales was "inapposite [because] the
holding there turned on specific facts not present here." 136 The HLP III
court is correct in that the "specific facts" of Scales were not present in
its case; nonetheless, tests are designed to apply to more than one fact
pattern. 37
The third reason why Scales applies to § 2339B is that courts have
already applied Scales to conduct in the past. Besides the HLP I1 court's
application of Scales to § 2339B, 131 the HLP II court recognized other
cases where the Ninth Circuit has applied Scales to conduct., 39 For ex-
ample, in Hellman v. United States, the Ninth Circuit overturned a con-
viction under the Smith Act where "the defendant had engaged in a vari-
ety of activities to support the Communist Party including organizing
new members, teaching Communist principles to students and members,
and 'soliciting contributions for the Communist Party."",140 These activi-
ties go beyond mere membership and indeed closely resemble elements
of "material support" under § 2339A, including the furnishing of person-
nel, training, and services. Moreover, in Rucker v. Davis the Ninth Cir-
cuit recently applied Scales to conduct that did not involve a membership
statute.' 4 ' In Rucker, the court considered whether the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act permitted the Oakland Housing Authority to evict tenants for illegal
drug-related activity that occurred in the household without the tenant's
knowledge. 42 Citing Scales, the court held that the evictions could not
136. Id. at 1142-43. The HLP III court also stated that "a close reading of Scales reveals that at
heart, it was concerned with criminalizing associational membership in violation of the First
Amendment." Id. at 1143. Interestingly, a close reading of Scales also reveals that, even though
claims under the Fifth Amendment's right to personal guilt and the First Amendment's right to the
freedom of association can intertwine, the Fifth Amendment "claim stands ... independently of the
claim made under the First Amendment." Scales, 367 U.S. at 225. And it was under this Fifth
Amendment claim that the Scales Court developed the personal guilt test. Id.
137. The Scales test applies to this particular fact pattern because, as discussed infra Part
IV(d), the words of the test and the policies behind it apply with equal force to conduct and status.
138. HLP II, 352 F.3d 382, 393-97 (9th Cir. 2003). Curiously, the HLP III court seemed to
recognize as much, stating: "Significantly, the Ninth Circuit in HLP 11 did not extend its Fifth
Amendment analysis of Scales to require that the government prove specific intent to further terrorist
activities." HLP Ill, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 1148 (emphasis added). Thus, while acknowledging that
HLP I applied its Scales personal guilt analysis to § 2339B, the HLP III court nonetheless simulta-
neously maintained that the Scales personal guilt test does not apply to § 2339B.
139. HLP 11, 353 F.3d at 395. The court was referring to Hellman v. United States, 298 F.2d
810 (9th Cir. 1961) and Brown v. United States, 334 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1964) (en banc), affd on
other grounds, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
140. HLP II, 352 F.3d at 395 (quoting Hellman, 298 F.2d at 813).
141. Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1124-25 (2001), rev'd on other grounds, 535 U.S. 125
(2002).
142. Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1117.
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stand because "penalizing conduct that involves no intentional wrongdo-
ing can run afoul of the Due Process Clause."'' 43
Thus, under previous Ninth Circuit analysis, Scales applies to any
statute where guilt is imputed based on a status or conduct that creates a
relationship with a criminal enterprise. Therefore, Scales applies to
§ 2339B. This conclusion is illustrated by the principle behind Scales,
the explicit language of the test, and its subsequent judicial
interpretation.
C. Two Courts, Two Fundamental Errors
1. The Al-Arian Court Did Not Apply Actual Test
While the Scales test may apply to the material support statute, it
does not necessarily compel the Al-Arian result. The Al-Arian court con-
cluded that the Scales test requires specific intent because "criminal li-
ability is being justified and tied to the criminal activities of others.'
But the Al-Arian court missed the most essential step in the analysis: ap-
plication of the Scales test. The Al-Arian court did not apply the test, it
merely determined the test should be applied and then adopted the con-
clusion of Scales. In other words, because liability is tied to the criminal
activity of others, the Scales test applies. However, the Supreme Court in
Scales did not hold that any time A's liability is tied to B's illegal activi-
ties, A can be held liable only if he had the specific intent to further B's
illicit goals. Rather, Scales requires a court to analyze the substantiality
of the relationship between A's apparently innocuous conduct and B's
concededly illegal activities. The Al-Arian court did not examine this
relationship; instead, the court skipped the required analysis. Thus, the
Al-Arian result of specific intent is not necessarily required without first
properly analyzing § 2339B under the Scales test.
2. The HLP 11 Court Did Not Test Scales
Against the Knowledge Standard
If the Al-Arian court took Scales too far, the Ninth Circuit in HLP II
may not have taken Scales far enough. The Ninth Circuit focused its
inquiry on the strict liability standard, and having found "serious due
process concerns,"' 145 the court read the knowledge standard into the stat-
ute. 146 That is, the court held that a person could not be convicted under
143. Id. at 1124 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Scales, 367 U.S. 203, 224-25
(1961)).
144. United States v. AI-Arian, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
145. HLP 11, 352 F.3d at 397.
146. Id. at 400.
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§ 2339B unless he or she had knowledge that the recipient of the dona-
tion was an FTO or had engaged in terrorist activities. 147 However, there
is no indication that the court then tested how this knowledge standard
fares against Scales. In fact, at the close of the Ninth Circuit's analysis of
the Scales test, the court implies that it only considered the due process
concerns in the strict liability context: "[W]e believe that to attribute the
intent to commit unlawful acts punishable by life imprisonment to per-
sons who acted with innocent intent-in this context, without critical
information about the relevant organization--contravenes the Fifth
Amendment's requirement of 'personal guilt."''1 48 Unlike HLP II, the
following analysis will test Scales against the knowledge standard to
determine if any "serious due process concerns" remain.
D. Why Mere Knowledge Is Insufficient: How the Scales
Test Implicates Constitutional Issues for § 2339B
The Scales test determines what types of relationships with criminal
organizations can serve as the basis for criminal liability. Where guilt is
imputed to an individual based on his or her conduct, the test requires
that a court determine if the conduct has a substantial relationship to the"concededly criminal activity" of the organization. 149 If there is a sub-
stantial connection, then no more culpability is required; if the connec-
tion is weak, then the statute must be interpreted to require culpability or
be struck down by the court.150 Thus, with regards to § 2339B, it is es-
sential to a Scales analysis to establish (1) what the conduct is, (2) what
is Congress's concern or what is "the concededly illegal activity," and
(3) whether the relationship between the two is sufficiently substantial to
justify imposing liability without requiring culpability.
First, the "conduct" involved here is undoubtedly satisfied by the
provision of "material support" as it is defined by § 2339A.151 Such con-
duct is wide ranging. It can appear harmless, like the Al-Arian court's
example of the taxi cab driver providing "transportation" by giving a ride
to a member of an FTO. Or the conduct can be clearly offensive, like
providing "training" by teaching a member of an FTO how to build an
explosive device.
Second, it is necessary to ascertain what the concededly illegal ac-
tivity is. In Scales, the concededly illegal activity, or "underlying
147. Id.
148. Id. at 397 (emphasis added).
149. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S 203, 224-25 (1961).
150. HLP II, 352 F.3d at 396.
151. For a list of material support, see supra Part Ill(a).
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substantive illegal conduct,"' 52 was not the existence of membership or
the support of the Communist Party, but rather the "advocacy" of vio-
lently overthrowing the government. 153 This violent advocacy was-as
the Ninth Circuit in Brown v. United States put it-the "gist of the
crime," or "the sole basis of federal concern" of the Smith Act. 154 Refer-
ring to congressional findings, the Ninth Circuit in HLP II determined
the "sole basis of federal concern" of § 2339B to be "international terror-
ism. ' 155 It follows that the concededly criminal activity of § 2339B is not
merely providing something to an FTO, but instead is international
terrorism. 156
Finally, having defined the "conduct" and the "concededly criminal
activity," Scales requires a court to analyze the relationship between the
provision of "material support" (both humanitarian and illicit support)
and the promotion of international terrorism "in order to determine
whether that relationship is indeed too tenuous to permit its use as the
basis of criminal liability."' 57 When support is inherently violent, there is
irrefutably a substantial relationship because there is a direct causal rela-
tionship between the conduct and the crime. For example, the provision
of weapons or the facilitation of a terrorist attack is inherently violent
and thus substantially related to the crime of international terrorism.
Consequently, so far as § 2339B is a prohibition on the provision of such
violent support, a culpable intent, although easily inferred from such sup-
port, is not required by Scales. As Senator Hatch correctly stated when
discussing § 2339B, the Constitution does not protect the facilitation of
terrorist bombings and other violent behavior. 58 Similarly, when a dona-
tion is readily fungible, like money, members of an FTO can easily use
the support to further the illegal goals of the organization. As a result, the
relationship between such conduct and international terrorism can be
strong. Accordingly, this form of support is also unacceptable, and a
showing of personal guilt would not likely be required under Scales.
Congress was particularly concerned with the danger of this type of do-
nation when it passed § 2339B.' 59
152. Scales, 357 U.S. at 226.
153. Id. at 225.
154. Brown v. United States, 334 F.2d 488, 496 (9th Cir. 1964) (en banc), aff'd on other
grounds, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
155. HLP II, 352 F.3d at 396 (citing AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-32, § 301(a)(1), 110 Stat. 1214
(1996)).
156. This article defines "international terrorism" as a foreign organization that engages in
"terrorist activity" as it is defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2005). For the list of activities
that constitute "terrorist activity," see supra note 15.
157. Scales, 367 U.S. at 226 (emphasis added).
158. 142 CONG. REC. S3352-01 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
159. AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-32, § 301, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
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The more difficult question concerns donations that are neither in-
herently violent nor readily fungible but are instead intended to support
the humanitarian efforts or peaceful goals of a designated organization.
This question is not merely based in abstract theory; courts in the Ninth
Circuit have been presented with this issue.' 60 Before Congress enacted
the AEDPA, some of the plaintiffs in the Humanitarian Law Project
cases participated in numerous activities fitting this description on behalf
of the PKK, including the following: conducting fact-finding missions to
investigate the mistreatment of Kurds in Turkey; publishing reports de-
tailing the Turkish government's practice of detaining and torturing
Kurds who speak out for equal rights; advocating to Congress and the
U.N. Commission on Human Rights; training members of the PKK on
how to use international human rights law to obtain recognition as a mi-
nority group and seek a peaceful resolution to the dispute; producing
educational literature supporting the PKK; and providing lodging to
members of the PKK in connection to the above activities. 16 1 But fearing
prosecution under § 2339B, the Humanitarian Law Project plaintiffs
ceased assisting Kurds living in Turkey since the PKK was designated as
an FTO. 162
Similarly, other plaintiffs in the Humanitarian Law Project cases
had previously engaged in peaceful activities on behalf of the LTTE that
now may be considered "material support. ' '163 For example, Dr.
Nagalingam Jeyalingam, both a Tamil refugee and a naturalized U.S.
citizen and surgeon, along with several Tamil organizations, provided"clothing, baby food, educational materials, and toys to the LTTE-run
orphanages" in LTTE-controlled Sri Lanka. 164 The plaintiffs also desired
to provide legal fees so the LTTE could challenge its designation as an
FTO to the D.C. Circuit Court. 165 Additionally, after the tsunami in De-
cember 2004 devastated the LTTE-controlled coast of northeastern Sri
Lanka, 166 the plaintiffs wished to "provide training in the presentation of
claims to mediators and international bodies for tsunami-related aid [and]
offer legal expertise in negotiating peace agreements between the LTTE
and the Sri Lankan government." 67 Other humanitarian groups not
160. See, e.g., the Humanitarian Law Project cases.
161. HLP 11, 352 F.3d 382, 389-90 (9th Cir. 2003).
162. Id. at 390.
163. Id. at 390-92.
164. Id. at 391-92.
165. Id. at 392.
166. Over 40,000 Sri Lankans were killed in the tsunami and the northeastern coast, controlled
by the LTTE, was one of the hardest hit regions of the island. See, e.g., Oversight Hearing, supra
note 42 (testimony of Ahilan T. Arulanantham, Staff Attorney for the American Civil Liberties
Union of Southern California).
167. HLP III, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1137 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
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associated with the Humanitarian Law Project litigation desired to fur-
nish medical supplies and personnel168 to the LTTE-controlled coast to
provide much needed public health assistance and to help rebuild the
coast. 169
All of the above donations could qualify as "material support" un-
der § 2339A,170 and would consequently be prohibited by § 2339B, but it
is difficult to envisage how such conduct strengthens international terror-
ism. Much of the aid-such as training in the use of international law-is
geared toward permanently steering these organizations away from vio-
lence and into the mainstream political arena. Still more of the support-
such as sending volunteers to help reconstruct a shattered coastline-is
aimed at assisting civilians involuntarily under the control of an FTO.
Interestingly, Congress has already provided tacit approval for the propo-
sition that not all aid emboldens terrorists or furthers their ability to carry
out attacks. Congress specifically exempted medicine and religious mate-
rials from "material support" under § 2339A, presumably because the
potential benefits from such provisions outweigh the threat posed to
national interests. Nonetheless, this type of aid would do little to help any
organization's ability to carry out terrorist attacks.
But it is possible that even seemingly harmless aid could have the
effect of bolstering the organization's reputation, which could thereby
indirectly strengthen its ability to carry out terrorist attacks. However, by
permitting membership, comparable reputational benefits could have
accrued to the Communist Party through increasing the number of its
official supporters. But the Scales Court determined that this "sort of
moral encouragement which comes from the knowledge that others
believe in what the organization is doing"' 171 was still too tenuous a rela-
tionship with the underlying substantive illegal conduct to justify impos-
ing guilt without individual culpability. 72 Similarly, any moral encour-
agement an FTO obtains from receiving training in international law,
from knowing that the children under its control are being educated and
fed, or from rejoicing that the wrongs its ethnic group has suffered at the
hands of its government are being publicized internationally, is not
168. Although medicine is exempted from "material support or resources," medical supplies
and personnel are not. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1).
169. See Oversight Hearing, supra note 42.
170. The above support could be categorized under § 2339A as providing tangible property,
currency, training, expert advice or assistance, and personnel. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2004).
171. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 227 (1961).
172. Id. at 227-28. Moreover, Congress already permits individuals to vigorously promote the
beliefs and goals of an FTO, so long as they do so independently of the FTO's operations. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B(h).
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sufficiently related to the promotion of international terrorism to justify
imposing personal guilt on those who provided such support.
This type of humanitarian conduct has neither the intent nor the
substantive effect of strengthening international terrorism. Even if the
donor knows the recipient is a designated FTO, a donation of this sort
falls far short of some "significant action" in support of the "criminal
enterprise."'173 In fact, unlike the defendant's membership in Scales,
which was held to be constitutionally protected, this type of humanitarian
conduct may even fall short of a "mere ... expression of sympathy with
the alleged criminal enterprise."' 17 4 With this form of support, the donor
may actually intend that the organization renounce its illegal objectives
and pursue strictly nonviolent goals. Or the donor may want nothing to
do with the objectives of the FTO, but merely intend to assist people who
live under the FTO's control in a time of need. Thus, the causal connec-
tion between the conduct and the crime, if existent, is weak.
As a result, because § 2339B currently exists with the knowledge
standard, the relationship between this particular conduct-providing
donations that are not readily fungible and that solely support the peace-
ful efforts of the organization-and the concededly criminal conduct of
FTOs-intemational terrorism-is not sufficiently substantial to meet
the requirements of the Due Process Clause and personal guilt. Criminal
liability cannot constitutionally be imputed to a donor of such support.
Therefore, if Congress does not amend the statute to require more than
the knowledge standard, it risks § 2339B being struck down by a court.
But § 2339B undoubtedly addresses a legitimate and compelling gov-
ernment interest, and in the majority of circumstances the statute does
not offend the Due Process Clause. Consequently, in order to avoid
endangering national security and unnecessarily weakening § 2339B, any
amendment to the statute must be drafted very carefully.
V. RELIEVING THE DUE PROCESS CONCERNS:
A RECKLESSNESS STANDARD
This Part analyzes some options available to Congress if it were to
amend § 2339B. It begins by making an important distinction between
knowledge and intent. It then highlights some of the prosecutorial bur-
dens a specific intent standard would create and emphasizes that the low-
est intent standard that can satisfy Scales is preferable. This Part con-
cludes by arguing that a reckless intent standard would both satisfy
173. Id. at 228.
174. Id.
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Scales and not hinder the government's ability to combat international
terrorism.
A. Potential Mens Rea Tools: Knowledge and Intent
The current version of § 2339B requires that a donor have a guilty
knowledge, but not a guilty intent. In other words, the donor must know
the recipient is an FTO, but the donor need not intend for the donation to
be used illicitly. 75 Thus, the difference between knowledge and intent is
that under the knowledge standard, the actual intent of the donor is
irrelevant. However, as demonstrated above, the knowledge standard is
inadequate; therefore, the next step is to determine what level of a culpa-
ble intent can save § 2339B from offending Scales.
B. Lowest Constitutional Standard Preferable
As the Al-Arian court properly concluded, the specific intent stan-
dard satisfies the requirement of personal guilt.176 However, specific in-
tent is merely one end of the culpability spectrum.' 77 In order to comply
with Congress's intention of prosecuting § 2339B "to the fullest possible
basis, consistent with the Constitution,"' 178 it is necessary to ascertain the
lowest level of culpability that is consistent with the Due Process Clause.
Otherwise, the government could be unduly and unnecessarily burdened
in its prosecution efforts, and donors secretly harboring violent intentions
could exploit the feeble statute effortlessly. The challenge of modifying
§ 2339B is to allow for a very specific type of donation to comply with
the Due Process Clause while not creating a mile-wide loophole in the
process.
175. By requiring that only a guilty knowledge be read into § 2339B, the Ninth Circuit must
have believed that any form of mens rea-guilty knowledge or guilty intent-can be employed
under Scales to relieve a statute of its personal guilt requirement. However, this position finds little
support in Scales; although Scales does not suggest that only a specific intent standard could cure a
statute of due process concerns, it also does not suggest that merely a guilty knowledge would suf-
fice. Indeed, the Scales Court stated that the Smith Act's due process concerns were "duly met when
the statute [was] found to reach only 'active' members having also a guilty knowledge and intent."
Scales, 367 U.S. at 228 (emphasis added). Thus, even before HLP II insufficiently applied the Scales
test, it may have already imputed a deficient mens rea requirement into § 2339B.
176. United States v. AI-Arian, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
177. There are four levels of intent. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (2002). Under § 2.02, an
individual can act: (1)purposefully, intending to harm (i.e., specific intent); (2) knowingly, knowing
the harm is likely to occur even if he does not consciously seek to cause the harm (this level of intent
differs fundamentally from the knowledge standard because it requires the donor to "know" he is
creating the harm-i.e., furthering international terrorism-while the knowledge standard merely
requires that the donor know the recipient is an FTO and how the donor intends the donation be used
is irrelevant); (3) recklessly, knowing the risk of harm, but making a conscious decision to ignore it;
or (4) negligently, not aware of risk but should have been. Id.
178. AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-32, § 301, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
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C. Specific Intent Standard Unnecessarily Opens Loopholes
Under the specific intent standard promulgated by the Al-Arian
court, a donor would be liable only if he or she intends to aid the terrorist
functions of an FTO. An often-used example illustrates the security flaws
of this standard: if a person writes a check to Hamas for $10,000 and
writes on the "memo" line of the check "for educational purposes only,"
the donor would not be liable under the specific intent standard so long
as there was not other evidence showing an intention to aid terrorism.
But, whether the donor intended to aid terrorism or not, the check could
be used for many other projects, including illicit ones. The Al-Arian
court anticipated this hypothetical and suggested that "a jury could infer
a specific intent ... if the money [donated] is fungible" and the defen-
dant knows the organization continues to sponsor illegal acts. 179 But such
a standard nonetheless opens a wide door to creative terrorist sympathiz-
ers and creates a serious evidentiary burden for law enforcement. Many
donations of goods and services that do not consist of fungible money
can still easily be converted to help further an FTO's illegal activities.
And those who convincingly plead ignorance while secretly desiring to
support the terrorist functions of FTOs can escape prosecution. However,
these escapees can be exposed through a lower intent level: recklessness.
D. The Recklessness Standard
A person acts "recklessly" if he or she is aware of the risk of harm
but makes a conscious decision to act anyway. 180 Because § 2339B al-
ready requires a guilty knowledge-the donor must know the recipient is
a potentially dangerous organization'sl'-any donor prosecuted under
§ 2339B could already be said to have been "aware" of the risk of
harm. 182 Under a recklessness standard, a donor could decide to provide
some specific support despite knowing the risk, but he or she would have
to proceed with extreme caution or risk criminal liability.
The following is a proposed amendment to § 2339B, which at-
tempts to comply with Scales and navigate the treacherous evidentiary
waters to ensure that no loophole would be exploited by donors who seek
to further terrorists' violent objectives:
Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a for-
eign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall
179. United States v. Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1339 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
180. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02.
181. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2004).
182. This is what technically makes a recklessness standard more appropriate than a negligence
standard; a person who acts negligently is by definition unaware of the risk of harm. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.02.
[Vol. 30:777
Material Support Offense and Personal Guilt
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or
both, and if the death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for
any term of years or for life. To violate this paragraph, a person
must (1) specifically intend to support the illegal aims of the FTO,
or (2) not specifically intend to support the illegal aims of the FTO
but nonetheless recklessly support the terrorist functions of the FTO
by either (a) supplying readily fungible items or (b) not ensuring
sufficient oversight over the supplied resources to make certain they
are not utilized illegally.
This Comment does not contend that § 2339B should be construed
in such a fashion as to permit the provision of risky donations. A reck-
lessness standard would satisfy this objective by effectively prohibiting
any donation that is facially or potentially dangerous, regardless of the
donor's apparent noble intentions.
A recklessness standard would place a major burden on the donor.
The government would not be required to prove any direct linkage be-
tween the donation and a violent act; instead, to avoid liability the defen-
dant would have to show that his or her donation was not readily fungi-
ble and there was proper oversight over the donation to ensure it was
used lawfully. In this sense, a recklessness standard would create a nar-
row statutory safe-harbor for well-intentioned, careful donors. If a donor
cannot show that the support did not aid the terrorist functions of an
FTO-thereby falling under the protection of the safe-harbor provision-
then he or she acted recklessly and is culpable. Significantly, the above
rule would also not leave room for any donations whatsoever to so-called
"single-method" organizations, like al-Qaeda, because all donations to
such organizations support their illegal objectives. More fundamentally,
however, the recklessness standard would impute personal guilt into
§ 2339B and would relieve that statute of its due process concerns.
While ostensibly not leaving much room for donations, this revised
standard would permit some charitable aid in limited circumstances. For
example, the statute would not be violated by any non-reckless efforts to
influence an FTO to employ legal avenues to obtain its goals. Thus, the
Humanitarian Law Project plaintiffs could once again train members of
the PKK how to use international law to advocate their peaceful political
goals with international bodies.
Nor would the statute be violated by any non-reckless efforts to aid
the humanitarian goals of an FTO. For example, medical personnel and
other volunteers could be deployed to the LTTE-controlled northeastern
coast of Sri Lanka to directly help with the tsunami reconstruction ef-
forts. Further, Dr. Jeyalingam could once again provide children's cloth-
ing, baby food, non-controversial educational materials, and toys to the
2007]
Seattle University Law Review
LTTE-run orphanages. While the vast majority of even well-intentioned
humanitarian aid would still be prohibited by a recklessness standard,
these are a few examples of the types of limited aid that would be
permissible.
An examination of some of the hypothetical situations courts have
used to illustrate troubles with § 2339B also sheds light on how the
recklessness standard would function. For example, a cab driver who
knowingly transports a member of an FTO to the U.N. building is not
inherently reckless in doing so; but he would be reckless by not exercis-
ing sufficient oversight if, for example, he witnessed the known terrorist
building a bomb in the back of the cab and did nothing. And if a person
wrote a check to an FTO to build a school, that person would have reck-
lessly provided a readily fungible item and would be liable. Another in-
teresting example is the Al-Arian hypothetical in which A, a member of
an FTO who only supports its peaceful activities, lets B, a known terror-
ist in the FTO, use his home, phone, and car. 183 Then, unbeknownst to A,
B uses all three for illicit fundraising. 84 According to the Al-Arian court,
A would be unfairly liable under § 2339B for providing lodging, com-
munications equipment, and transportation to an FTO.185 However, under
the recklessness standard, A would still be liable because he does not
lack culpability-A let a known terrorist use his home, phone, and car
without monitoring him at all. And A's support of the terrorist directly
resulted in money being raised for the FTO. In other words, A failed to
ensure sufficient oversight when he provided the above mentioned re-
sources and was consequently reckless.
A recklessness standard could also alleviate the concern that an
FTO could raise money "under the cloak of a humanitarian or charitable
exercise"1 86 because such a standard places a heavy burden on donors to
ensure the aid provided is appropriate and is used appropriately. Most
likely, few donors have the resources or capacity to ensure their non-
fungible aid is not used to support the terrorist functions of an FTO. As a
result, a recklessness standard would permit only a very small amount of
aid to flow into the hands of a very small number of FTOs, and only in
circumstances where the prospect of furthering international terrorism is
very, very low, or may not even exist at all. But for the first time, the
standard would tie a culpable intent to the statute, relieving § 2339B of
its requirement of personal guilt.
183. Al-Arian, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 1300.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-32, § 301, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
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VI. CONCLUSION
With the language of § 2339B, the statute's 2004 amendment, and
the congressional record, Congress has patently indicated its intent to
incorporate the knowledge standard into § 2339B. In doing so, Congress
was aware that such a statute would prevent well-intentioned donors
from providing aid to the legal and legitimate aims of FTOs. All but one
court considering the mens rea issue of § 2339B has agreed with Con-
gress that the Constitution requires nothing more than a guilty knowl-
edge. But the most serious constitutional challenge to § 2339B remains
insufficiently addressed: personal guilt. As demonstrated in the preced-
ing Parts, the relationship between a donor's conduct and the concededly
criminal activity of an FTO can lack sufficient substantiality to justify
imposing a guilty intent on the donor. The several courts that have con-
sidered this challenge all failed to properly apply the personal guilt test
supplied by the Supreme Court in United States v. Scales. The results of
this test demonstrate the need for Congress to amend the statute to ensure
constitutional application in all situations. With an amendment to
§ 2339B to include a recklessness standard, the statute would satisfy the
due process requirement of personal guilt and would not hamper the
government's ability to cut the economic legs of international terrorism.
The dangers posed by FTOs are real. As a result, one of the most
important jobs of our government is to prevent terrorists from wreaking
havoc on American soil and elsewhere in the world. The necessary cost
of such vital protection is often our freedoms and liberties. But the line
between order and liberty is not drawn by the degree to which the gov-
ernment can prosecute potential sympathizers with ease; the line is drawn
by the Constitution. Congress cannot infringe on our constitutionally pro-
tected rights. To satisfy the right in jeopardy here-the due process right
to proof of personal guilt-thankfully does not require any major prose-
cutorial hurdles that could endanger our national security. Instead of im-
peding the government's War on Terrorism, amending § 2339B to in-
clude a recklessness standard may actually help save it. Carefully tar-
geted humanitarian aid may actually help steer FTOs away from vio-
lence, as well as diminish popular support for an FTO's violent activities
by facilitating economic development, while concomitantly improving
access to health care and education. In other words, the cautious charita-
ble hand of the American citizen may help ameliorate intolerable condi-
tions in the most desperate corners of the world and could consequently
be an invaluable tool in the War on Terrorism. Above all, this guarded
generosity should not be sacrificed at the expense of our constitutionally
protected rights.
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